2

Idea behind my approach is that crypto virusses attack every network drive they can find, if we can keep the backup drive 'hidden' than the virus cannot get to it.

I have a small bash script that runs on a QNAP that mounts a C:\Users folder on a given Windows PC using a specific user/passwd. After a successful mount a RSYNC runs, 'backing' up the folder, after which the folder gets unmounted. Other than a specific user (hidden) on (every) Windows PC, there is nothing needed on the Windows PCs.

Currently my script is very basic (lots of hardcoded stuff) but I want to expand it so it can reach every PC on a small biz. network, grab what is needed and disconnect.

Am I re-inventing the wheel? Is there already something like this available on QNAP (or as a Linux shell script) ?

Any other way to not 'mount' a network drive in windows but still be able to backup PCs to QNAP/NAS?

Thank you for sharing your thoughts & ideas.

Peter

PeterLinux
  • 31

1 Answers1

0

I would do a different approach

  • MAP the QNap from Windows, backup normally.

  • From there keep a external disk plugged in the QNap, activate a scheduled dump on it daily. (the disk is not accessible outside the qnap)

  • Activate the snapshot schedule too, unlike shadow copy that a crypto can corrupt, it would add another layer that the crypto might have difficulty to break.

yagmoth555
  • 17,495